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Human Capital and the Rise and
Fall of Families
1
Gary S. Becker and Nigel Tomes
1. Introduction
Ever since Pareto discovered that the distribution of larger incomes and
wealth is reasonably well approximated by a particular skewed distribu-
tion, since then called the "Pareto distribution," economists have contin-
ued to discuss inequality in the distribution of earnings, income, and
wealth among individuals and families. However, they have paid little
attention to the inequality within families over generations as deter-
mined by the relation between the incomes or wealth of parents, chil-
dren, and later descendants. Schumpeter is the only major economist
who systematically considered intergenerational mobility with empirical
evidence as well as with theoretical analysis (see Schumpeter 1951).
Sociologists and other social scientists, on the other hand, have pre-
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sented considerable empirical evidence on the occupations, education,
and other characteristics of children and parents. Blau and Duncan
(1967), in the influential book The American Occupational Structure, con-
sider the effect of family background on the achievements of children.
As long ago as 1889, John Dewey wrote, "[U]pon the average, children
of parents who are exceptional, or who deviate from the mean, will
themselves deviate from the mean only one third of their parents' devia-
tion. ... It is not likely that children of the poor would be better off, and
children of the wealthier poorer in anything like the ratio of 2/3"
(Dewey [1889, pp. 333-34]; this statement was brought to our attention
by O. D. Duncan).
Although discussions of inequality among families have been almost
entirely separate from discussions of inequality between generations of
the same family, these inequalities are analytically closely related. In par-
ticular, regression away from the mean in the relation between, say, the
incomes of parents and children implies large and growing inequality of
income over time, while regression toward the mean implies a smaller
and more stable degree of inequality. These statements are obvious in a
simple Markov model of the relation between parents and children:
Il+1 = a+bl, + e,+ lt (1)
where It is the income of parents, I, + , is the income of children, a and
b are constants, and the stochastic forces affecting the income of chil-
dren (e/+ j) are assumed to be independent of the income of parents.
Inequality in income will continue to grow over time if b is greater
than or equal to unity, while inequality in income will approach a con-
stant level if b is smaller than unity in absolute value. Clearly, the size of
b also measures whether children of richer parents tend to be less rich
than their parents and whether children of poorer parents tend to be
better off than their parents. This example implies that, even in rigid
and caste-dominated societies, many of the elite and underprivileged
families would change places over generations unless inequality contin-
ued to grow over time (b^ 1).
The degree of regression toward or away from the mean in the
achievements of children compared to those of their parents is a meas-
ure of the degree of equality of opportunity in a society. The purpose
of this paper is to analyze the determinants of unequal opportunities,
sometimes called "intergenerational mobility," or, as in the title of our
paper, "the rise and fall of families." We use all these terms inter-
changeably.
The many empirical studies of mobility by sociologists have lacked aINTRODUCTION 259
framework or model to interpret their findings. We try to remedy this
defect and to fill a more general lacuna in the literature by developing
a systematic model that relies on utility-maximizing behavior by all parti-
cipants, equilibrium in different markets, and stochastic forces with un-
equal incidence among participants.
An analysis that is adequate to cope with the many aspects of the rise
and fall of families must incorporate concern by parents for children as
expressed in altruism toward children, investments in the human capital
of children, assortative mating in marriage markets, the demand for chil-
dren, the treatment by parents of exceptionally able or handicapped
children, and expectations about events in the next or in even later gen-
erations. Although these and other aspects of behavior are incorporated
into a consistent framework based on maximizing behavior, we do not
pretend to handle them all in a satisfactory manner. However, our ap-
proach indicates how a more complete analysis can be developed in
the future.
The next section has a lengthy discussion of investments in the human
capital of children. The discussion is lengthy because the relation be-
tween the earnings of parents and children is the major determinant of
the rise and fall of most families. Section 3 moves on to consider the
interaction between investments in human capital, transfers of material
wealth (gifts and bequests) from parents to children, and the evolution
of consumption over generations.
Section 4 considers the effect of the number of children on intergen-
erational mobility of consumption and wealth and also the effect on mo-
bility of assortative mating in marriage markets.
Section 5 assembles about a dozen studies of the degree of regression
to the mean between parents and children in income, earnings, and
wealth. Available studies are few and are based on limited data, but the
magnitudes of some basic parameters of our model are suggested by the
evidence for the United States and other countries.
Much of our analysis of human capital is based on the model devel-
oped in Becker's Woytinsky Lecture (1967) to explain different invest-
ments among families. However, that lecture is mainly concerned with
inequality and skewness in earnings and wealth and does not derive rela-
tions between the earnings and assets of parents and children. The ap-
proach in this paper is also based on a series of papers by us in the last
decade that analyzes marriage, fertility, altruism of parents, and long-
run equilibrium relations between parents and children (see esp. Becker
1974, 1981; Becker and Tomes 1976, 1979; Tomes 1981).
The present paper is closest in spirit to Becker and Tomes (1979),
but these papers differ in important ways. We believe that the present260 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
discussion is a considerable improvement. We now distinguish human
capital and earnings from other wealth, and we incorporate restrictions
on the intergenerational transfer of debt. We assume now that parents'
utility depends on the utility of children instead of on the permanent
income of children. We also consider the effect of endogenous fertility
on the relation between the wealth and consumption of parents and
children. These improvements explain why the implications of the pres-
ent paper are sometimes quite different from those of the earlier paper.
In an essay devoted to critiquing parts of Becker (1981), Becker and
Tomes (1984), and an earlier draft of this paper, Goldberger (1985)
sometimes fails to see these differences between the current paper and
our earlier work. We comment further on his critique elsewhere in this
paper.
Since inequality over generations and inequality between families are
closely related (as implied by eq. [1]), any adequate analysis of inequal-
ity must also consider marital patterns, fertility, expectations about fu-
ture generations, and investments in human capital. Therefore, it is
hardly surprising that a growing literature during the last 15 years has
tried to integrate more realistic models of family behavior into models
of the distribution of income and wealth.
2 Although this literature and
our work have many similarities, the present paper is almost alone in
relating the rise and fall of families to investments in human capital that
interact with the accumulation of assets, the evolution of consumption,
and the demand for children.
2. Earnings and Human Capital
Perfect Capital Markets
Some children have an advantage because they are born into families
with greater ability, greater emphasis on childhood learning, and other
favorable cultural and genetic attributes. Both biology and culture are
transmitted from parents to children, one encoded in DNA and the
other in a family's culture. Much less is known about the transmission of
cultural attributes than of biological ones, and even less is known about
the relative contributions of biology and culture to the distinctive en-
dowment of each family. We do not need to separate cultural from ge-
- Among the important contributors to this literature are Stiglitz (1969), Blinder (1974),
Conlisk (1974), Behrman and Taubman (1976), Meade (1976), Bevan (1979), Laitner
(1979), Menchik (1979), Shorrocks (1979), Loury (1981), and Atkinson (1983).EARNINGS AND HUMAN CAPITAL 261
netic endowments, and we will not try to specify the exact mechanism
of cultural transmission. We follow our previous paper (Becker and
Tomes 1979; see also, e.g., Bevan 1979) in assuming as a first approxima-
tion that both are transmitted by a stochastic-linear or Markov equation:
E\ = ctt + hE\_x + v[ (2)
where Et is the endowment (or vector of endowments) of the ith family
in the rth generation, h is the degree (or vector of degrees) of "inherit-
ability" of these endowments, and \ft measures unsystematic components
or luck in the transmission process. We assume that parents cannot in-
vest in their children's endowment.
A priori restrictions on the magnitude or even on the sign of the in-
heritability of endowments are unnecessary since the degree of inherit-
ability can be estimated from accurate information on the earnings of
parents and children (and perhaps also grandparents). Yet the assump-
tion that endowments are only partially inherited, that h is less than unity
and greater than zero, is a plausible generalization to cultural endow-
ments of what is known about the inheritance of genetic traits. This as-
sumption implies that endowments regress to the mean: children with
well-endowed parents tend also to have above-average endowments but
smaller relative to the mean than their parents', whereas children with
poorly endowed parents tend also to have below-average endowments
but larger relative to the mean than their parents'.
The term a, can be interpreted as the social endowment common to
all members of a given cohort in the same society. If the social endow-
ment were constant over time, and if h < 1, the average endowment
would eventually equal 1/(1 — h) times the social endowment (i.e., lim
Et = a/[l — h]). However, a may not be constant because, for example,
governments invest in the social endowment.
Practically all formal models of the distribution of income that con-
sider wages and abilities assume that abilities automatically translate into
earnings, mediated sometimes by demands for different kinds of abili-
ties (see, e.g., Roy 1950; Mandelbrot 1962; Tinbergen 1970; Bevan and
Stiglitz 1979). This is useful in understanding certain gross features of
the distribution of earnings, such as its skewness, but is hardly satisfac-
tory for analyzing the effect of parents on their children's earnings. Par-
ents not only pass on some of their endowments to children, but they
also influence the adult earnings of their children by expenditures on
their skills, health, learning, motivation, "credentials," and many other
characteristics. These expenditures are determined not only by the abili-
ties of children but also by the incomes, preferences, and fertility of par-262 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
ents as well as the public expenditures on education and other human
capital of children and other variables. Since earnings are practically the
sole income for most persons, parents influence the economic welfare
of their children primarily by influencing their potential earnings.
To analyze these influences in a simple way, assume two periods of life,
childhood and adulthood, and that adult earnings depend on human
capital (H), partly perhaps as a measure of credentials, and market
luck (€):
+ e, (3)
The earnings of one unit of human capital (7) is determined by equilib-
rium in factor markets. It depends positively on technological knowl-
edge (T) and negatively on the ratio of the amount of human capital to
nonhuman capital in the economy (f). Since we are concerned with
differences among families, the exact value of 7 is not usually important
because that is common to all families. Therefore, we assume that the
measurement of H is chosen so that 7 = 1.
Although human capital takes many forms, including skills and abili-
ties, personality, appearance, reputation, and appropriate credentials,
we further simplify by assuming that it is homogeneous and the same
"stuff in different families. Since much research demonstrates that in-
vestments during childhood are crucial to later development (see, e.g.,
Bloom 1976), we assume also that the total amount of human capital
accumulated, including on-the-job training, is proportional to the
amount accumulated during childhood. Then adult human capital and
expected earnings are determined by endowments inherited from par-
ents and by parental (x) and public expenditures (s) on his or her devel-
opment:
Ht = \\i(xt_v st_v Et), with ^. > 0, j = x, s, E. (4)
Ability, early learning, and other aspects of a family's cultural and ge-
netic "infrastructure" usually raise the marginal effect of family and pub-
lic expenditures on the production of human capital; that is,
The marginal rate of return on parental expenditures (rm) is defined by
the equationEARNINGS AND HUMAN CAPITAL 263





where drm/dE > 0 by inequality (5).
Although the human capital of different persons may be close substi-
tutes in production, each person forms a separate human-capital "mar-
ket." Rates of return to him depend on the amount invested in him as
well as on aggregate stocks of human capital. Marginal rates of return
eventually decline as more is invested in a person because investment
costs eventually rise as his forgone earnings rise. Also, benefits decline
increasingly rapidly as his remaining working life shortens (see the more
extended discussion in Becker [1975]).
Nonhuman capital or assets can usually be purchased and sold in rela-
tively efficient markets. Presumably, therefore, returns on assets are less
sensitive to the amount owned by any person than are returns on human
capital. Little is known about the effect of abilities, other endowments,
and wealth on returns from different assets, although some theory sug-
gests a positive relation (see Ehrlich and Ben-Zion [1976]; see also the
evidence in Yitzhaki [1984]). Our analysis only requires the reasonable
assumption that returns on assets are much less sensitive to endowments
and accumulations by any person than are returns on human capital (a
similar assumption is made in Becker [1967, 1975]). A simple special
case of this assumption is that the rate of return on assets is the same to
all persons.
Much of the endowed luck of children (v) is revealed to parents prior
to most of their investment in children. Therefore, we assume that rates
of return on these investments are fully known to parents (as long as
the social environment [ct(] and public expenditures [5,_J are known).
Parents must decide how to allocate their total "bequest" to children
between human capital and assets. We assume initially that parents can
borrow at the asset interest rate to finance expenditures on children and
that this debt can become the obligation of children when they are
adults.
Parents are assumed to maximize the welfare of children when no
reduction in their own consumption or leisure is entailed. Then parents
borrow whatever is necessary to maximize the net income (earnings mi-
nus debt) of their children, which requires that expenditures on the







with gE > 0 (by eq. [6]), gr < 0, and also with gs < 0 (8)264 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
if public and private expenditures are substitutes. Parents can separate
investments in children (an example of the separation theorem) from
their own resources and altruism toward children because borrowed
funds can be made the children's obligation.
The optimal investment is given in chart 12 by the intersection of the
horizontal "supply curve of funds," rr, with a negatively inclined demand
curve (HHor H'H'). This figure clearly shows that better-endowed chil-
dren accumulate more human capital; those with the endowment E ac-
cumulate ON units of expenditure, while those with E > £ accumulate
ON' > ON. Therefore, better-endowed children would have higher ex-
pected earnings because equation (3) converts human capital into ex-
pected adult earnings. The total effect of endowments on earnings, and
the inequality and skewness in earnings relative to that in endowments,
is raised by the positive relation between endowments and expenditures.
CHART 12.
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Clearly, an increase in the rate of interest reduces the investment in
human capital and, hence, earnings. Compare ON and ON in chart 12.
The effect of an increase in public expenditures is less clear. If public
expenditures are perfect substitutes dollar for dollar for private expendi-
tures, the production of human capital would be determined by their
sum (x + s) and by E; an increase in public expenditures would then
induce an equal decrease in private (parental) expenditures, and the
accumulation of human capital would be unchanged. Even then, a suf-
ficiently large increase in public expenditures would raise the accumula-
tion of human capital because private expenditures cannot be negative.
Note that the human capital and earnings of children would not
depend on their parents' assets and earnings because poor parents
can borrow what is needed to finance the optimal investment in their
children. However, the income of children would depend on parents
because gifts and bequests of assets and debt would be sensitive to the
earnings and wealth of parents. Indeed, wealthy parents would tend to
self-finance the whole accumulation of human capital and to add a siz-
able gift of assets as well.
Although the earnings and human capital of children would not be
directly related to parents' earnings and wealth, they would be indirectly
related through the inheritability of endowments. The greater the de-
gree of inheritability, the more closely related would be the human capi-
tal and earnings of parents and children. To derive the relation between
the earnings of parents and children, substitute the optimal level of x
given by equation (7) into the earnings-generating equation (3) to get
.. r), Vl, £J +€t = <!>(£,, V:, r) + €, (9)
where ,^
Since this equation relates E to Y, €, g, and r, Et can be replaced by Et_A
from (2) and then Yt can be related to Yt_1 €t, vt, €t_l and other variables:
Yt = F(Yt_h €t_v vt,h, st_v s_v rt, rt_v a) + €,. (10)
Not surprisingly, the earnings of parents and children are more
closely related when endowments are more inheritable (h). However,
the relation between their earnings also depends on the total effect of
endowments on earnings ($E)- If this effect is independent of the level
of endowments (ty^ = 0), then266 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
Y = c + a<b + hY +€*
where €* = €,- h€t_, + <$>Evt
and ct= c(st_v st_2, h, rt, r,_x).
The intercept ct would differ among families if government expenditures
(
st-i> V2) differed among them. The stochastic term €,* is negatively
related to the market luck of parents.
If the luck of adults and children (€*) is held constant, the earnings
of children would regress to the mean at the rate of 1 — h. However, the
coefficient is biased downward by the "transitory" component of lifetime
earnings of parents (t^J in OLS regressions of the actual lifetime earn-
ings of children on the actual lifetime earnings of parents (Yt on Yt_x).
If ct is the same for all families, the expected value of the regression
coefficient would equal
where cr| and &* are the variances of €, and Yt. This coefficient is closer
to the degree of inheritability when the inequality in the transitory com-
ponent of lifetime earnings is a smaller fraction of the total inequality
in lifetime earnings.
Families of particular races, religions, castes, or other characteristics
who suffer from market discrimination earn less than do families with-
out these characteristics. Persons with characteristics that are subject to
discrimination earn less than do persons not subject to discrimination
even when their parents' earnings are equal. Persons subject to discrimi-
nation would earn less—given the degree of inheritability—as long as
discrimination reduces the earnings from given endowments, for dis-
crimination then reduces the intercept in the equation that relates the
earnings of parents and children (ct + afyE in eq. [11]).
Imperfect Access to Capital
Access to capital markets to finance investments in children separates
the transmission of earnings from the generosity and resources of par-
ents. Economists have argued for a long time, however, that human capi-
tal is poor collateral to lenders. Children can "default" on the market
debt contracted for them by working less energetically or by entering
occupations with lower earnings and higher psychic income. SuchEARNINGS AND HUMAN CAPITAL 267
"moral hazard" from the private nature of information about work effort
and employment opportunities can greatly affect the earnings realized
from human capital. Moreover, most societies are reluctant to collect
debts from children that were contracted by their parents, perhaps be-
cause the minority of parents who do not care much about the welfare
of their children would raise their own consumption by leaving large
debts to children.
To bring out sharply the effect of imperfect access to debt contracted
for children, we assume that parents must finance investments in chil-
dren either by selling assets, by reducing their own consumption, by re-
ducing the consumption by children, or by raising the labor-force activi-
ties of children. Consider parents without assets
3 who would have to
finance the efficient investment in human capital (say, CWin chart 12)
partly by reducing their own consumption because they cannot contract
debt for their children. A reduction in their own consumption would
raise its marginal utility relative to the marginal utility of resources in-
vested in children. This would discourage some expenditure on chil-
dren. Consequently, both the amount invested in children and parental
consumption are reduced by limitations on the debt that can be left to
children. Clearly, richer parents would tend to have both higher con-
sumption and greater investments in children.
Therefore, expenditures on children by parents without assets depend
not only on endowments of children and public expenditures, as in
equation (7), but also on earnings of parents (K,_,), their generosity to-
ward children (w), and perhaps now also on the uncertainty (e,^) about
the luck of children and later descendants, as in
wUBH-i withg*>0.
Public and private expenditures would not be perfect substitutes if pub-
lic expenditures affected rates of return on private expenditures, as
when tuition is subsidized. However, if they are perfect substitutes, g*
would depend simply on the sum of s,_, and F,_,: an increase in public
expenditures is then equivalent to an equal increase in parental earn-
ings. The effect of children's endowments on investments is now ambig-
uous (gl~ 0) because an increase in their endowments raises the re-
sources of children as well as the productivity of investments in their
human capital. Expenditures on children are discouraged when chil-
1 Even parents who accumulate assets over their lifetime may lack assets while investing
in children.268 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
dren are expected to be richer because that lowers the marginal utility
to parents of additional expenditures on children.
The demand curves for expenditures in chart 13 are similar to those
in chart 12 and are higher in families with better-endowed children. The
cost of funds to a family is no longer constant or the same to all families.
Increased expenditures on children lower the consumption by parents,
which raises their subjective discount rates (the shadow cost of funds).
These discount rates are smaller to parents with higher earnings or more
poorly endowed children. Expenditures on children in each family are
determined by the intersection of supply and demand curves. An in-
crease in parental earnings shifts the supply curve to the right and in-
duces greater expenditures on children (compare 5, and 5', in chart
13). The distribution of intersection points determines the distribution
of investments and rates of return and, hence, as shown in Becker (1967,
1975), the inequality and skewness in the distribution of earnings.
By substituting equation (13) into the earnings-generating equations
(3) and (4), we get
CHART 13.
Parental expenditures on children, with capital constraints.
Rate of
Return
So (Given Ej, Yo)
o (Given Eo , Yo)
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Yt=^[f{Et,Yt_vkt_,),st_A,E} +€t (14)
= 4>*(£, Y_V kt_x) + e,
where kt_l includes w, st_x, and et_v Earnings of children now depend directly on the earnings of parents as well as indirectly through the trans-
mission of endowments. Some authors (e.g., Bowles 1972; Meade 1976;
Atkinson 1983) argue for a direct effect because "contacts" of parents
are said to raise the opportunities of children; others argue for a direct
effect because parents are said to receive utility directly from the human
capital of children. Fortunately, the effects of parent earnings on access
to capital can be distinguished analytically from its effects on "contacts"
and "utility."
The indirect effect of parents' earnings on the earnings of children
operates through the transmission of endowments and can be found by
substituting El_1 for Et and then using equation (14) for Et_x:
Yt = F(Yt_v Yt_2, €t_v vt, h, at, *_,, *_8) + €r (15)
The sum of both the direct and the indirect effects of parents' earn-
ings is
The indirect effect of grandparents' earnings, holding parents' earnings
constant, is
Earnings of grandparents and grandchildren are indirectly linked
through the constraints on financing investments in children. That is,
the earnings of parents are not sufficient to describe the effects on chil-
dren of both the resources and the endowments of parents. Equation
(17) shows that an increase in the earnings of grandparents lowers the
earnings of grandchildren when parents' earnings and grandchildren's
luck are held constant. Constraints on financing investments in children
introduce a negative relation between the earnings of grandparents and270 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
grandchildren and raise the positive effect of parents' earnings on chil-
dren's earnings.
4
If F( were approximately linearly related to Et and Yt_v then
5
Yt == c't + (p* + h) Yt_x - $*hY,_2 + Ct, with B* = <}>;. (18)
The coefficient of parents' earnings exceeds the degree of inheritability
by the marginal propensity to invest in the human capital of children
(S*). As in equation (12), OLS estimates of the coefficient of Yt_x are
biased downward by the transitory component of lifetime earnings. Or-
dinary least squares estimates of the relation between Yt and Yl_1 tend
toward
6
3* < A* = M-I-<-2 < mind R* + h h* )
where b* t_x . t_2 is the partial regression coefficient between Yt and Yt_x. Therefore, both partial and simple regression cofficients between the
lifetime earnings of parents and children provide upper limits of the
effect of capital market constraints on the propensity to invest in chil-
dren. The biases in these OLS estimates can sometimes be overcome by
4 Goldberger (1985, pp. 16-17) perhaps properly takes us to task for expressing too
much "surprise" in our earlier work about a negative coefficient on grandparents' wealth
(or income) because this is implied by our model (Becker and Tomes [1979] say that a
negative coefficient "may seem surprising" [p. 1171]; Becker [1981] says "it is surprising"
[p. 148]). However, we never claimed that an increase in grandparents' wealth would
lower the wealth of grandchildren (Goldberger's discussion [1985, p. 2] is misleading
about our claims). We have asked how persons who start with a presumed relation among
the wealth of grandchildren, parents, and grandparents would interpret a negative coeffi-
cient on grandparents' wealth such as is found in Wahl's study (1985) reported in table 23.
5 A similar equation is derived in Becker and Tomes (1979, eq. 25). However, the coeffi-
cient called B there refers to the propensity to bequeath all capital, including debt, to
children, not to the propensity to invest in the human capital of children by parents who
cannot leave debt. The approximation in eq. (18) would be linear in the logs of the earn-
ings of children, parents, and grandparents if the endowment and earnings-generating
equations are linear in logs. Then B* + h would give the percentage increase in the earn-
ings of children per 1% increase in the earnings of fathers, and similarly for — B*/j.
B Equation (18) implies that
^B* + h-^-- Ap*6;if.
If the economy is in long-run equilibrium (see Becker and Tomes 1979), then
b* l_1 = b*_lt, (j
2y = (T
2y, and the equality in eq. (19) follows. The relation between b*l_l
and the right-hand side of eq. (19) is derived in Becker and Tomes (1979, app. E).EARNINGS AND HUMAN CAPITAL 271
the use of instruments for the lifetime earnings of parents, such as the
lifetime earnings of uncles or of great-grandparents (see Goldberger
1979; Behrman and Taubman 1985).
The direct relation between the earnings of parents and children in
equation (14) is likely to be concave rather than linear because obstacles
to the self-financing investments in children decline as parents' earnings
increase. When investments in the human capital of children are suffi-
cient to lower marginal rates of return to the market rate on assets, fur-
ther increases in parents' earnings raise the assets bequeathed to chil-
dren but have no effect on the amount invested in the human capital
of children (if rates on assets are independent of parents' earnings).
Presumably, "contacts" of parents and the direct utility to parents from
the human capital of children are more important in richer families.
Hence, capital constraints have different implications for the curvature
of the relation between the earnings of parents and children than do
these alternative explanations.
Becker and Tomes's (1979) discussion implies that, because 3* and h
enter symmetrically, even knowledge of the true values of the coeffi-
cients attached to parents' and grandparents' incomes in an equation
such as (18) could not identify 3* and h without other information, such
as which coefficient is larger. Earnings in rich families not subject to
capital constraints are related by the simple equation (11), which does
not include 3*- Therefore, h would be known if the coefficient on par-
ents' earnings in rich families is known. Then 3* and h could be distin-
guished in equation (18) by using this information on h.
In earlier drafts of the present paper we unwisely denote 3* by 3>
although 3 in Becker and Tomes (1979) refers to a different concept.
Since the coefficient 3* measures the marginal propensity to invest in
the human capital of children by capital constrained parents who are
prevented from making the wealth-maximizing investment in their chil-
dren, 3* does not enter the earnings-generating equation for richer fam-
ilies (eq. [11]) who are not so constrained. Put differently, 3* is zero in
richer families. There is no general presumption about the size of 3*
relative to h even in low-income families because 3* depends on public




r earlier work (see, e.g., Becker and Tomes
1979) measures the marginal propensity to bequeath wealth to children
when parents can leave debt to children and when human wealth is not
distinguished from other wealth. Our earlier work and Section 3 of the
present paper show that this propensity depends on the generosity of
parents toward children and may not be sensitive to the level of income.
However, it is likely to be large in most families (see Sec. 3). Such a272 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
presumption motivated the assumption in our earlier work that (3 > h,
an assumption used to identify (3 and h from the coefficients in an equa-
tion such as (18).
Goldberger (1985, pp. 19-20) correctly states that we did not provide
an independent way to evaluate this assumption. The present paper
makes progress toward the goal of identification because h can be deter-
mined from knowledge of the coefficients in the equation for the earn-
ings of parents and children in (richer) families who leave positive be-
quests to children. Given h, 3* (or a more general relation between 3*
and parents' earnings) can be determined from knowledge of the coef-
ficients on parents' or on grandparents' earnings in the earnings equa-
tion for poorer families who are capital constrained. Even 3—the mar-
ginal propensity of parents to bequeath wealth to children—might be
determined from information on the relation between the consumption
of parents and children in richer families (see the next section).
Rich families can more readily self-finance a given investment in chil-
dren than can poor and middle-level families. Richer families also have
better than average endowments, which raises the wealth-maximizing in-
vestment in human capital by richer families above that by poorer fami-
lies. Empirical observations strongly indicate that richer families come
closer to financing the optimal investment in the human capital of chil-
dren than do poorer families. This indicates that the wealth effect on
investments in children dominates the endowment effect. The wealth
effect would dominate if endowments regress strongly to the mean, for
then the endowments of richer children would be much below those of
their parents and the endowments of poorer children would be much
above those of their parents. The evidence considered in Section 6 does
suggest that endowments relevant to earnings do regress strongly to
the mean.
If returns on assets are not highly sensitive to earnings and endow-
ments, the greater resources available to rich families to finance wealth-
maximizing investments in children imply that equilibrium marginal
rates of return on investments in children are lower in richer families
than they are in more capital constrained poor and middle-level families
even though endowments and average rates of return are higher in
richer families. Equilibrium marginal rates then tend to decline, per-
haps not monotonically, as earnings of parents rise. Eventually, marginal
rates on human capital would equal the rate of return on assets, and
then marginal rates would be relatively constant as parents' earnings
rose. Poorer children are at a disadvantage both because they inherit
lower endowments and because capital constraints on their parents limit
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If marginal rates are lower in richer families, a small redistribution of
human capital away from these families and toward children from
poorer families would raise the average marginal rate of return across
different families. This would raise efficiency even though endowments
and the average productivity of investments in children are greater in
richer families (see also Becker 1967, 1975). The usual conflict between
"equity," as measured by inequality, and efficiency is absent because a
redistribution of investments toward less advantaged children is equiva-
lent to an improvement in the efficiency of capital markets.
Larger public expenditures on the human capital of children in fami-
lies subject to capital constraints raise the total amount invested in these
children even when public and private expenditures are perfect substi-
tutes. The reason is that public expenditures increase the total resources
of a family if taxes are imposed on other families. An increase in family
resources in capital constrained families is shared between parents and
investments in children in a ratio determined by the marginal propen-
sity to invest ((3*). If public and private expenditures are perfect substi-
tutes, the fraction 1 — (3* of government expenditures on children is
offset by compensatory responses of their parents. That is, to further
equity toward other family members, even constrained parents redistrib-
ute some time and expenditures away from children who benefit from
government expenditures to siblings and themselves. Compensatory re-
sponses of parents apparently greatly weaken the effects of public health
programs, food supplements to poorer pregnant women, some Head
Start programs, and social security programs (see the discussion in
Becker [1981, pp. 125-26, 251-53]).
We saw earlier in Section 2 that the total investment in children in
families with positive bequests to children is unaffected by public expen-
ditures on children that are perfect substitutes for parents' expendi-
tures. Parents reduce their own expenditures to offset fully such public
expenditures. However, public and private expenditures may not be per-
fect substitutes. If, for example, public expenditures raise rates of return
on family expenditures, increased public expenditures could even raise
family expenditures because a "substitution effect" works against the "re-
distribution effect."
Goldberger criticizes us (1985, pp. 9-10; Simon [in press] repeats
Goldberger's criticism) because we emphasize redistribution or income
effects at the expense of substitution effects when discussing various pub-
lic programs. Since our first joint paper we have explicitly noted that
government programs may have substitution effects by changing rates
of return on parental investments in children (see Becker and Tomes
1976, p. S156). However, we have emphasized the redistribution effects274 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
of many programs—including Head Start programs, welfare, aid to
pregnant women, and social security—because the redistribution effects
are clear, while substitution effects are not clear, even in direction. For
example, what is the substitution effect of a social security program? Or
is there evidence that Head Start programs raise rather than lower mar-
ginal rates of return on parents' expenditures? (See Becker 1981, p.
126.) Although tuition subsidies to education may appear to raise rates
of return on parents' expenditures on education, actually they might
lower marginal rates of return when combined with rationing of places
(see Peltzman 1973).
Redistributions of expenditures within families induced by govern-
ment subsidies can explain why many programs appear to have weak
effects on participants (see the discussion in Becker [1981, pp. 125-26,
251-53]). Of course, weak effects on participants do not imply that sub-
stitution effects are negligible or that they reinforce redistribution ef-
fects, but weak effects do imply that these programs do not have strong
offsetting substitution effects.
Capital constrained parents could finance expenditures on children
by reducing their life-cycle savings if children could be counted on to
care for elderly parents. In many societies, poorer and middle-income-
level parents are supported during old age by children instead of by the
sale of gold, jewelry, rugs, land, houses, or other assets that could be
accumulated by parents at younger ages. Our analysis suggests that these
parents choose to rely on children instead of on assets because rates of
return on investments in children are higher than they are on other
assets.
In effect, poorer and middle-level parents and children often have an
implicit contract, enforced imperfectly by social sanctions, that parents
invest in children in return for support during old age. Both parents
and children would be made better off by such contracts if investments
in children yield a high return, where included in the yield is any insur-
ance provided by children against an unusually long old age.
3. Assets and Consumption
Our analysis implies that bequests and gifts of assets to children do
not rise rapidly until marginal rates of return on investments in chil-
dren are reduced to the rate on assets. Further increases in contribu-
tions from parents then mainly take the form of assets rather than of
human capital because returns on assets are less sensitive to the
amount accumulated. These conclusions imply that most bequests toASSETS AND CONSUMPTION 275
children are found in a relatively small number of richer families and
that the ratio of assets to human capital of children would rise as
parents' wealth rose. The empirical evidence clearly indicates that
assets and income from nonhuman capital are much more important
in richer than in poorer families.
Empirical studies also indicate that the proportion of income saved
remains reasonably constant or that it rises as income, including "perma-
nent" income, increases (see the studies reviewed in Mayer [1972]).
However, these studies provide flawed measures of savings because in-
vestments in human capital and "capital gains or losses" from intergener-
ational increases or decreases in endowments are not considered sav-
ings. Lower- and middle-income families invest primarily in their
children's human capital. Endowments tend to increase from parents to
children at lower income levels and to decrease from parents to children
at higher levels because of regression to the mean in endowments.
Therefore, empirical studies understate relative savings by lower- and
middle-income families because both intergenerational capital gains
and investments in human capital are relatively larger in these families.
We believe that an appropriate concept of savings may well show that
the fraction saved declines as permanent income rises. After all, this
would be expected if equilibrium marginal rates of return on invest-
ments in children decline as income increases.
Our conclusion that most bequests of assets are found in a relatively
small number of richer families does not presuppose "class" differences
in altruism or other class differences in the propensity to save, as in
Kaldor (1956) and Pasinetti (1962), or as used in Atkinson (1983). In
our analysis, all families have the same intrinsic tendency to save and
leave estates because they are assumed to have the same altruism toward
children. Still, apparent "class" differences in savings would exist be-
cause poorer families save mainly in the human capital of children,
which are not recorded as savings or bequests.
The assets of a person are determined by bequests from parents and
by his own life-cycle accumulations. We assume that parents choose be-
quests by maximizing their expected utility, subject to the expected earn-
ings and life-cycle asset accumulation of children. To develop further
our analysis of bequests, we must turn to an explicit treatment of utility
maximization by parents. We continue to assume, until the next section,
that each adult has one child without marriage.
Suppose that the utility function of parents is additively separable in
their own consumption and in various characteristics of children. Most
of our analysis does not depend on a specific measure of these character-
istics as long as they are positively related to the total resources of chil-276 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
dren. However, we can simplify the relation between the consumption
by parents and children by assuming that parents' utility depends on the
utility of children as in
Ut = u(Z) + hUl+1, (20)
where Zt is the consumption of parents and 8 is a constant that measures
the altruism of parents.
If the preference function given by equation (20) is the same for all
generations and if consumption during childhood is ignored, then the
utility of the parent indirectly would equal the discounted sum of the
utilities from the consumption of all descendants:
t/, = |>M(Z,+1). (21)
!=0
The utility of parents depends directly only on the utility of children, but
it depends indirectly on all descendants because children are concerned
about their descendants.
We assume that parents succeed in maximizing their "dynastic" utility,
as represented by equation (21). This rules out bargaining by children
to obtain larger transfers than those that maximize parents' utility. A
more general assumption is that parents maximize a weighted average
of their own and their children's utility, with weights determined by bar-
gaining power (see the normative use of this assumption in Nerlove,
Razin, and Sadka [1984]); however, this generalization would not
change any major conclusions.
With perfect certainty about rates of return and incomes in all genera-
tions, the first-order conditions to maximize utility are the usual ones.
For example, with a constant elasticity of substitution in consumption,
u'(Z) = Z-°, (22)
where cr > 0, and
lnZ,+ 1 =^ln(l + r,+1)8 + In Z,, (23)
where rl+, measures the marginal rate of return to investments in chil-
dren in period t. With an exponential utility function,
u'(Z) = e-f
z, p>0, (24)
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Z,+ ] = *ln (1 + Vl)8 + Z, (25)
If parents could finance expenditures on their children with debt that
becomes the obligation of children, the marginal cost of funds would
equal the rate on assets in all families. Then equation (23) or equation
(25) implies that the relative or absolute change in consumption be-
tween generations would be the same in all families that are equally al-
truistic (8) and that have equal degrees of substitution (cr or p). Each
family would maintain its relative or absolute consumption position over
generations, and consumption would not regress to the mean. Stated
differently, any degree of relative or absolute inequality in consumption
in the parents' generation would then be fully transmitted to the chil-
dren's generation.
Nevertheless, the earnings of children would still regress to the mean,
regardless of the altruism of parents, as long as endowments are not fully
inherited by children (see Sec. 2). Consumption does not automatically
regress to the mean when earnings do because parents can anticipate
that their children would tend to earn less or more than they do. They
can use debt and assets to offset the effect on wealth of the expected
regression in earnings.
Therefore, although earnings may regress to the mean, well-being as
measured by consumption would not regress at all if parents have full
access to capital markets to finance investments in their children's hu-
man capital. The assets bequeathed to children would rise and the debt
bequeathed would fall as parents' earnings rose. This crucial distinction
between regression across generations in earnings and consumption ap-
pears to have been ignored in the extensive literature on the mobility
of families.
Still, the main implication of equations such as (23) and (25) is disqui-
eting, namely, that all initial differences among families in consumption
and total resources are fully transmitted to future descendants. Surely,
the resources of the current generation are essentially independent of
the resources of their distant ancestors. Several forces are responsible
for the decay over time in the influence of the past on consumption
and total resources. These include difficulties in transmitting debt to
children, uncertainty about the future, the effect of parents' wealth on
fertility, and imperfect assortative mating. We consider these variables
in turn.
Consumption is fully separated from earnings only when children can
be obligated for debts created by parents. If debt cannot be created for
children (see the discussion in Sec. 2), parents without assets could not278 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
offset any upward regression in the endowments and earnings of their
children. Parents would face a complicated maximization problem be-
cause capital constraints may be binding only for some descendants. The
results of utility maximization can be summarized by endogenously de-
termined subjective discount rates and marginal rates of return for each
generation of a family that guide as well as reflect the decisions for that
generation. These shadow prices exceed the rate on assets whenever
constraints on access to debt prevent borrowing from children. Discount
rates of (richer) parents with sufficient assets to raise or lower their be-
quests to children would equal the rate on assets.
We argue in Section 2 that equilibrium marginal rates of return of
constrained parents tend to decline as their earnings become larger.
Then equation (23) or equation (25) implies that the relative or abso-
lute growth in consumption between generations would also decline as
the earnings of parents rose. However, the relative or absolute growth
in consumption between generations would be constant among richer
families who receive a marginal rate of return equal to the rate on assets.
Therefore, the consumption of children would regress more rapidly up-
ward to the mean in poor families than downward to the mean in rich
families. This produces a convex relation between the consumption of
parents and children. At the same time, earnings regress more slowly
upward in poor families than they regress downward in rich families.
Assets bequeathed to children in richer families act as a buffer to off-
set any regression to the mean in the earnings of children. The richest
families could maintain their consumption over time compared to less
rich families only by increasing their bequests sufficiently to offset the
stronger downward regression in the earnings of the richest children.
As a result, bequests could regress away from the mean.
Our analysis of consumption has assumed perfect certainty, although
uncertainty about much of the luck of future generations is not fully
insurable or diversifiable. If each generation knows the yields on invest-
ments in the human capital of children and in bequests to children, but
may not have perfect certainty about the earnings of children and is
still more uncertain about subsequent generations, then the first-order
condition for maximization of expected utility is
(26
)
where st refers to expectations taken at generation t before any new in-
formation about earnings and other wealth of descendants is acquired
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With the exponential function, this first-order condition becomes
Zt+l = c + iln (1 + rt+x)h + Zt + nl+l, (27)
where cis a positive constant and where nt+1, the distribution of fluctua-
tions in Z,+ 1 around Zt+V does not depend on Zr If the capital market permitted all families to finance the wealth-maximizing investments in
their children, rt+l = ra in all families, where ra is the asset rate. Then
equation (27) implies that the growth in consumption follows a random
walk with drift (Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak [1986] derive a similar
result when the length of life is uncertain). More generally, equation
(27) shows that, if the utility function is exponential, uncertainty adds a
random term to consumption but does not basically change the implica-
tions of our analysis concerning the degree of regression to the mean in
consumption.
A second-order approximation to the left-hand side of equation (26)
readily shows that the effect of uncertainty on the degree of regression
toward the mean with more general utility functions than the exponen-
tial depends on the signs and magnitudes of second- and higher-order
derivatives of the utility function.
7 Uncertainty could induce regression
toward the mean in consumption even when there would be none with
certainty. However, uncertainty could also induce regression away from
the mean, or greater rates of regression toward the mean at higher
rather than at lower levels of consumption, with utility functions that
otherwise seem as empirically relevant as those having opposite implica-
tions. Consequently, we cannot make any strong statement concerning
the effect of uncertainty on the degree of regression toward the mean
in the consumption of parents and children.








where u"'+l is the third derivative, w'"', is the fourth derivative of utility from consumption
in the t + 1 first generation, and v is the given variance of nt+i around Z(+1. The term on
the left-hand side is more likely to be less than one (regression toward the mean) when
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4. Fertility and Marriage
Regression toward the mean in marriage and the positive effect of
wealth on fertility help explain why differences in consumption and total
resources among richer families do not persist indefinitely into future
generations. Here we only sketch out an analysis. The implications of
fertility and marriage for consumption and bequests are also discussed
in Becker and Tomes (1984) and Becker and Barro (1985).
Let us first drop the assumption that all parents have only one child
and generalize the utility function in equation (20) to
Up= u(Zp) + a(n)nUr> (28)
with a' < 0, where Uc is the utility of each of the n identical children and
a{n) is the degree of altruism per child. The first-order condition for
the optimal number of children is that the marginal utility and marginal
cost of children are equal. The marginal cost of children to parents
equals net expenditures on children, including any bequests and other
gifts. The marginal costs are determined by the circumstances and deci-
sions of parents.
The previous section showed that the consumption and total re-
sources of wealthy families may not regress down because these families
can offset the downward regression in the earnings of their children by
sufficiently large gifts and bequests. Fortunately, this unrealistic implica-
tion does not hold when the number of children can vary. Richer fami-
lies tend to spend some of their greater resources on additional chil-
dren. This reduces the bequest to each child below what it would be if
they did not increase the number of children (see the proofs in Becker
and Barro [1985]). A positive response of fertility to increases in wealth
causes consumption and wealth per child to regress down, perhaps
rapidly.
Poor and middle-income families without assets who are prevented
from leaving debt to their children must trade off between earnings
of each child, number of children, and parent consumption. The
human capital invested in each child and, hence, the earnings of each
child would then be negatively related to the number of children, as
found in many studies (see, e.g., Blake 1981). The degree of regres-
sion to the mean in earnings among these families would be lower
if fertility and parents' earnings are negatively related than if they
are unrelated.
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Tomes 1976; Becker 1981, chap. 6; Tomes 1981) of responses to differ-
ences between children. This analysis implies that richer families invest
more human capital in better-endowed children and that they compen-
sate other children with larger gifts and bequests. Poorer families who
primarily invest in human capital face a conflict between the efficiency
of greater investments in better-endowed children and the equity of
greater investments in less well endowed children.
Despite the claim that observed differences between siblings in
earnings is helpful in determining the degree of intergenerational
mobility in earnings (see, e.g., Brittain 1977, pp. 36-37), there is no
necessary connection between the relation among siblings and the
degree of intergenerational mobility. The reason is that differences in
earnings between siblings is determined by characteristics within a
single generation, such as the substitution between siblings in the
utility function of parents, whereas intergenerational mobility in earn-
ings is determined by differences across generations, such as the re-
gression toward the mean of endowments (for a further discussion,
see Tomes [1984]).
Regression to the mean in marriage—called imperfect positive as-
sortative mating—also increases the degree of regression to the mean
in earnings, consumption, and assets. However, the effect of marriage is
less obvious than it may appear because parents often can anticipate the
marital sorting of children. For example, wealthy parents would use gifts
and bequests to offset some of the effects on the well-being of their chil-
dren of the tendency for rich children to marry down, just as they use
gifts and bequests to offset the effect of the regression downward in en-
dowments. Although a full analysis of the interaction between the behav-
ior of parents and expectations about the marriages of children is com-
plicated by bargaining between in-laws on the gifts to be made to their
children (some issues are discussed in Becker [1981, chap. 7] and
Becker and Tomes [1984]), one cannot be satisfied with the many mod-
els that simply ignore expectations about children's marriages (see, e.g.,
Stiglitz 1969; Pryor 1973; Blinder 1976; Atkinson 1983).
Fertility and marriage have not been fully integrated into our analysis
of intergenerational mobility—we only would insert "fully" into Gold-
berger's statement that "it's fair to say that [fertility and marriage are]
not integrated into his intergenerational system" (1985, p. 13). However,
the discussion in this section, the discussion of fertility in Becker and
Barro (1985), and that of marriage in Becker and Tomes (1984) indicate
to us that a utility-maximizing approach can integrate fertility, marriage,
and intergenerational mobility into a common framework with useful
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5. Empirical Studies
8
Only a few empirical studies link the earnings or wealth of different gen-
erations because of difficulties in gathering such information and be-
cause of insufficient interest by social scientists. Tables 22 and 23 present
estimates from several studies of the degree of regression to the mean in
earnings, income, and wealth, with coefficients of determination (when
available), the number of observations, and notes about other variables
(if any) included in each regression.
Table 22 has evidence on the earnings or incomes of sons and fathers
from three studies based on separate data sets for the United States and
one study each for England, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway.
9 Al-
though the average age of fathers and sons is quite different except in
the Geneva study, both Atkinson (1981) and Behrman and Taubman
(1983) present evidence that such differences in age do not greatly af-
fect the estimated degree of regression to the mean.
The point estimates for most of the studies indicate that a 10% in-
crease in father's earnings (or income) raises son's earnings by less than
2%. The highest point estimate is for York, England, where son's hourly
earnings appear to be raised by 4.4%. However, the confidence intervals
are sizable in all studies except Malmo because fathers' earnings "ex-
plain" a small fraction of the variation in the earnings of sons. Moreover,
response errors and the transitory component in father's earnings (or
income) may severely bias these regression coefficients.
1
0 Furthermore,
the analysis in Section 2 indicates that transitory variations in lifetime
earnings, and the omission of the earnings of grandparents biases these
regression coefficients downward. However, the error from omitting
grandparents' earnings would be small if parents' earnings do not have
a large effect (see eq. [18]) and if the transitory in lifetime earnings is
not large.
8 We are indebted to Robert Hauser for bringing to our attention several studies of inter-
generational mobility that use the data on Wisconsin high school graduates and for guid-
ing us through various adjustments that correct for response and measurement errors in
these studies.
9 These studies have various limitations. Hauser et al. (1975) sample families in only one
state (Wisconsin) and only include sons who graduated from high school; all fathers in
the Behrman and Taubman (1983) sample are twins; fathers in the Atkinson (1981) sam-
ple had modest earnings in the city of York; fathers in the de Wolff and van Slijpe (1973)
study are from the city of Malmo; Soltow (1965) uses a very small sample from one city in
Norway; and Girod (1984) surveys students in the canton of Geneva.
1
0 These estimates may also be biased (the direction is not clear) because information
is not available on hours worked and nonpecuniary income from employment (see the
discussion in Becker and Tomes [1984, n. 13]).EMPIRICAL STUDIES 283
Hauser et al. (1975) reduce response errors and the transitory compo-
nent by using a four-year average of parents' income and a three-year
average of son's earnings, while Hauser (in press) uses a four-year aver-
age of parents' income and a five-year average of son's earnings during
his initial period of labor-force participation. Tsai (1983) not only aver-
ages incomes of parents over several years but also uses a retrospective
report on their income in 1957. At Hauser's suggestion, we have cor-
rected for the response errors in father's earnings by using the analysis
in Bielby and Hauser (1977). Behrman and Taubman (1983) exclude
sons who have less than four years of work experience because their
earnings do not represent well their lifetime earnings. De Wolff and van
Slijpe (1973) and Freeman (1981) reduce the importance of the transi-
tory component by using the average income in father's occupation as
an estimate of his lifetime earnings.
Despite these adjustments for response errors and transitory incomes,
point estimates of the regression coefficients for earnings and incomes
are rather low in all the studies (except for large incomes in Sweden).
Moreover, a study in progress by Elizabeth Peters (1985) that uses data
from the National Longitudinal Survey (the same survey used by Free-
man [1981]) also finds a small coefficient (below .2) when a simple aver-
age of four years of son's earnings is regressed on a simple average of
five years of father's earnings.
Some indirect evidence of sizable regression toward the mean in life-
time earnings is provided by life-cycle variations in earnings. By defini-
tion, endowments are fixed over a lifetime. Therefore, earnings should
be more closely related over the life cycle than across generations be-
cause endowments are imperfectly transmitted from parent to child (en-
dowments are not a "fixed effect" across generations). Stated differently,
relative to other members of his cohort, a person is usually much more
similar to himself at different ages than is a father similar to his son
when they are of the same age. The correlation coefficient between the
"permanent" component of male earnings at different ages has been
estimated from a seven-year panel to be about .7 in the United States
(see Lillard and Willis 1978, table 1). The inheritability of endowments
from fathers to sons is surely less, probably much less, than is the correla-
tion between the permanent component of earnings at different ages.
The evidence in table 22 suggests that neither the inheritability of
endowments by sons (h) nor the propensity to invest in children's hu-
man capital because of capital constraints (P*) is large. For example, if
the regression coefficient between the lifetime earnings of fathers and
sons is ^.4 and if the transitory variance in lifetime earnings is less than
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would be less than .28 if h — (3*; moreover, h < .6 if P* = 0, and h < 0 if
3* > .4 (see n. 4).
If capital constraints completely disappeared, would the same families
dominate the best-paid and most prestigious occupations? (For this fear,
see the often-cited article by Herrnstein [1971].) The answer is no: fami-
lies in the best occupations would change frequently even in "meritocra-
cies" because endowments relevant to earnings are not highly inherit-
able—h is less than .6 and may be much less. Another way to see this is
by noting that, if the relation between the lifetime earnings of fathers
and sons is no larger than .4, practically all the advantages or disadvan-
tages of ancestors tend to disappear in only three generations: "from
shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations." Parents in such "open"
societies have little effect on the earnings of grandchildren and later
descendants. Therefore, they have little incentive to try to affect the
earnings of descendants through family reputation and other means.
In particular, any lifetime "culture of poverty" tends to disappear be-
tween generations because characteristics that determine earnings are
variable between generations. For example, children of parents who
earn only half the mean can expect to earn above 80% of the mean in
their generation, and their own children can expect to earn only slightly
below the mean.
Yet, family background is still important. For example, even if the de-
gree of regression to the mean is 80%, children of parents whose earn-
ings are twice the mean tend to earn 30% more than the children of
parents whose earnings are only 50% of the mean. A 30% premium is
large relative to the 10%-15% premium from union membership (see
Lewis 1986) or to the 16% premium from two additional years of school-
ing (see Mincer 1974). Children from successful families do have a sig-
nificant economic advantage.
Families who are poor partly because of discrimination against their
race, caste, or other "permanent" characteristics may advance more
slowly. Clearly, blacks in the United States have advanced much more
slowly than have immigrants, partly because of public and private dis-
crimination against blacks. Although many have studied changes over
time in the average position of blacks relative to whites (see, e.g., the
excellent recent study by Smith [1984]), few have studied the relation
between earnings of sons and fathers in black families. The evidence in
table 22 suggests that older blacks regress more rapidly to the mean than
do older whites, although the evidence may be spurious because re-
sponse errors are higher and apparently more complicated for blacks
(see Bielby, Hauser, and Featherman 1977). Opportunities for younger
blacks clearly have improved during the last 20 years. The evidence in
table 22 that younger blacks regress more slowly suggests that discrimina-EMPIRICAL STUDIES 287
tion raises the regression toward the mean in earnings (see the theoreti-
cal discussion in Sec. 2).
Goldberger points out (1985, pp. 29-30) that our earlier work uses
much higher illustrative values for (3 than the values of 3* suggested by
the empirical evidence in this section. But B and B* are different: to
repeat, B refers to the propensity to bequeath wealth to children by fami-
lies who are not capital constrained. Therefore, low B*'s are not inconsis-
tent with high B's. A low B* combined with a low h does imply sizable
intergenerational mobility in earnings, whereas a high B implies low in-
tergenerational mobility in wealth and consumption among families
that bequeath wealth to their children (we ignore the distinction be-
tween the wealth and consumption of children and the wealth and con-
sumption per child; see Sees. 3 and 4).
We readily admit (see Sec. 1) that the distinction in the present paper
between earnings, wealth, and consumption as well as our attention to
intergenerational capital constraints and fertility behavior have greatly
clarified our thinking about intergenerational mobility. However, since
a low B* is not inconsistent with a high B, we see no reason why the
empirical evidence of a low B* "would occasion the tearing of [our] hair
and the gnashing of [our] teeth" (Goldberger 1985, pp. 29-30). More-
over, aside from fertility and marriage, we still expect high values for B
(see Sec. 3).
Table 23 presents evidence from three studies for the United States
and Great Britain on the relation between the wealth of parents and
children. Harbury and Hitchens (1979) and Menchik (1979) use pro-
bates of wealthy estates, while Wahl (1985) uses data on wealth from the
1860 and 1870 censuses. The estimated elasticity between the assets of
fathers and sons is about .7 in the United States for probated assets in
recent years but is less both for assets of living persons in the nineteenth
century and for probated assets in Britain.
Wahl finds a small negative coefficient for grandparents' wealth when
instruments are used for both parents' and grandparents' wealth but a
positive coefficient for grandparents' wealth when their actual wealth is
used. The theoretical analysis incorporated into equation (18) does im-
ply a small negative coefficient for grandparents' wealth when the effect
of parents' wealth is not large, as is the case in her study. However, Behr-
man and Taubman (1985) usually find small positive (but not statistically
significant) coefficients on grandparents' schooling in their study of
years of schooling for three generations. Their findings may be inconsis-
tent with our theory, although equation (18) does imply a negligible
coefficient for grandfathers' schooling when the coefficient on parents'
schooling is small—it is less than .25 in their study.
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dence whether wealth or earnings regress less rapidly to the mean, al-
though wealth appears to regress less rapidly. Wealth would regress
slowly if parents bequeath assets to children to buffer the total wealth
and consumption of children against regression in their earnings. How-
ever, wealth would regress rapidly if wealthier parents have sufficiently
more children than do poorer parents. Wahl (1985) does find a strong
positive relation in the nineteenth century between the fertility and the
wealth of parents.
Capital constraints on investments in children probably declined dur-
ing this century in the United States and in many other countries be-
cause fertility declined, incomes rose, and government subsidies to edu-
cation and to social security grew rapidly. Evidence in Goldin and
Parsons (1984) is consistent with sizable capital constraints on poor fami-
lies in the United States during the latter part of the nineteenth century.
These families withdrew their children from school at early ages in order
to raise the contribution of teenage children to family earnings. A weak-
ening of capital constraints in the United States is also indicated by the
decline over time in the inequality in years of schooling and by the de-
clining influence of family background on education attainments of
children (Featherman and Hauser 1976).
There is evidence that the influence of family background on the
achievements of children is greater in less developed countries than it is
in the United States. For example, father's education has a greater effect
on son's education in both Bolivia and Panama than in the United
States. Moreover, the influence of father's education apparently de-
clined over time in Panama as well as in the United States (see Kelley,
Robinson, and Klein 1981, pp. 27-66; Heckman and Hotz 1985).
6. Summary and Discussion
This paper develops a model of the transmission of earnings, assets, and
consumption from parents to children and later descendants. The
model is based on utility maximization by parents concerned about the
welfare of their children. The degree of intergenerational mobility, or
the rise and fall of families, is determined by the interaction of utility-
maximizing behavior with investment and consumption opportunities
in different generations and with different kinds of luck.
We assume that cultural and genetic endowments are automatically
transmitted from parents to children, with the relation between the en-
dowments of parents and children determined by the degree of "inherit-
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heritability of endowments. Indeed, if all parents can readily borrow to
finance the optimal investments in children, the degree of intergenera-
tional mobility in earnings essentially would equal the inheritability of
endowments.
However, poor families often have difficulty financing investments in
children because loans to supplement their limited resources are not
readily available when human capital is the collateral. Such capital mar-
ket restrictions lower investments in children from poorer families. In-
tergenerational mobility in earnings then depends not only on the in-
heritability of endowments but also on the willingness of poor families
to self-finance investments in their children.
The degree of intergenerational mobility in earnings is also deter-
mined by the number of children in different families. Additional chil-
dren in a family reduce the amount invested in each one when invest-
ments must be financed by the family. Consequently, a negative relation
between family size and the earnings of parents also reduces the inter-
generational mobility of earnings.
Assets act as a buffer to offset regression to the mean in the endow-
ments and, hence, in the earnings of children. In particular, successful
families bequeath assets to children to offset the expected downward
regression in earnings.
Parents with good access to capital markets can transfer assets or debt
to nullify any effect of regression to the mean in earnings on the con-
sumption of children. This effectively separates the relation between the
consumption by parents and children from inheritability of endowments
and regression to the mean in earnings. Consumption in poorer and
middle-level families who do not want to leave bequests tends to regress
upward because equilibrium marginal rates of return on investments in
the human capital of children tend to be higher in families with low
earnings. Consumption and total resources in richer families that do
leave bequests to children regress down to the mean, mainly because
fertility is positively related to parents' wealth. In this way, larger families
dilute the wealth bequeathed to each child. Imperfect assortative mating
also tends to cause consumption and wealth to regress to the mean.
We have examined about a dozen empirical studies relating the earn-
ings, income, and assets of parents and children. Aside from families
victimized by discrimination, regression to the mean in earnings in the
United States and other rich countries appears to be rapid, and the re-
gression in assets is sizable. Almost all earnings advantages and disadvan-
tages of ancestors are wiped out in three generations. Poverty would not
seem to be a "culture" that persists for several generations.
Rapid regression to the mean in earnings implies that both the inher-292 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
itability of endowments and the capital constraints on investments in
children are not large. Presumably, these constraints became less im-
portant as fertility declined over time and as incomes and subsidies to
education grew over time.
In this paper and in previous work we claim that a theory of family
behavior is necessary to understand inequality and the rise and fall of
families. In making the claim, however, we have not intended to down-
grade the importance of empirically oriented studies. Indeed, we have
always viewed them as a necessary complement to theoretical analysis.
We apologize if our claims for maximizing theory could be interpreted
as denying the value of empirical and statistical work that is not explicitly
based on a model of maximizing behavior.
We still claim, however, that our model of family behavior is useful in
understanding the effect of public policies and other events on inequal-
ity and the rise and fall of families. Here we part company with Gold-
berger (1985), who denies whether our theory adds much to formula-
tions not based on a model of maximizing behavior. He claims (see esp.
pp. 30-33) that our theory has few implications that differ from simple
regressive models of the earnings or incomes of different generations of
a family. Perhaps some perspective about the validity of his claim can be
acquired through a brief summary of a few implications of our analysis.
1. Earnings regress more rapidly to the mean in richer than in poorer
families. Moreover, even though endowments of children and earnings
of parents are positively related, a small redistribution of investment in
human capital from richer to poorer families would tend to raise the
overall efficiency of investments. The reason is that investments by
poorer families are constrained by limited access to funds.
2. Unlike earnings, consumption would regress more rapidly to the
mean in poorer than in richer families if fertility is not related to par-
ents' wealth. Indeed, consumption then would not tend to regress at all
among rich families who leave gifts and bequests to their children.
3. However, our analysis also implies that fertility is positively related
to the wealth of parents. This dilutes the wealth that can be left to each
child and induces a regression to the mean among rich families in the
relation between consumption per child and the consumption of
parents.
We do not know of any other analysis of the family that has these impli-
cations, regardless of the approach used. The implications have not
been tested empirically, but Goldberger (1985) mainly questions the
novelty of the implications of our analysis, not its empirical validity. Addi-
tional implications are obtained by considering the effect of public pro-
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Becker and Tomes (1979, pp. 1175-78) show that a progressive in-
come tax could raise the long-run relative inequality in after-tax income.
The standard deviation clearly falls, but average incomes also fall eventu-
ally because parents reduce their bequests to children. Goldberger's use-
ful calculations (1985, pp. 24-25) support our analytical proof that an
increase in the degree of progressivity could actually lead to an increase
in after-tax inequality. His calculations suggest, however, that a couple of
generations would elapse before relative inequality might even begin to
increase. He overstates the delay before which inequality might begin to
increase, and he understates the likelihood of an eventual net increase,
by not considering the effect of greater progressivity on the contribution
to inequality of the unsystematic component of the tax system (see
Becker and Tomes 1979, pp. 1177-78)."
We are not concerned with inequality in this paper, but we believe that
the model developed here also implies that after-tax inequality might
increase when the degree of progressivity increases. Income taxes alter
behavior in our analysis partly by affecting the coefficients in equations
such as (11), (18), and (27). Empirical or regressive models that start
with such equations or with other equations not derived from an explicit
model of behavior across generations would have difficulty in analyzing
the effects of income taxes on the coefficients in these equations be-
cause such models usually provide insufficient guidance to how these
coefficients are determined.
This conclusion applies to other policies as well and to various
changes in the environment faced by families. Indeed, the issues are not
special to inequality and intergenerational mobility but apply to efforts
to understand all social behavior.
To illustrate with a different public program, consider the effects of
1' Although Goldberger admits that we only claim a possible long-run increase in in-
equality, he criticizes the statement that "perhaps this conflict between initial and equilib-
rium effects explains why the large growth in redistribution during the last fifty years has
had only modest effects on after-tax inequality" (Becker [1981, p. 156]; a similar statement
is in Becker and Tomes [1979, p. 1178]; Goldberger omits the "perhaps" in our statement
and says we "conjecture"). He asks, "Is it true that over the past fifty years, the mean and
variance of disposable income both fell? If not, what explanation has his model [i.e.,
Becker-Tomes] provided?" (1985, pp. 26—27). These are strange questions. We were not
foolish enough to contend that only the tax system affected the growth of incomes during
the past 50 years nor did we try to assess how other forces affected inequality. Since we
could prove with our model that a progressive income tax need not lower inequality in the
long run, and since inequality apparently did not decline significantly during the past 50
years, we speculated about whether progressive income taxes did lower inequality over this
period. Surely, that speculation could be very relevant in forcing a reassessment of the
common belief that progressive taxes lower inequality. Of course, other changes during
this period could have masked a negative effect of income taxes on inequality, but this has
to be proven rather than simply assumed.294 HUMAN CAPITAL AND FAMILY RISE AND FALL
public debt and social security on the consumption of different genera-
tions of a family. Barro (1974) uses a model of parent altruism that is
similar to the model of altruism in this paper, when fertility is fixed, to
question whether social security and public debt have significant effects
on consumption. Parents who make positive bequests to children do not
raise their consumption when they receive social security or revenue
from the issue of public debt. Instead, they raise their bequests to offset
the effect of these programs on the consumption of children. However,
the consumption of altruistic parents who are constrained from leaving
debt to children is raised by social security and public debt, and the
consumption of their children is lowered (see Drazen 1978).
To avoid misunderstanding, we hasten to add that we do not claim
that all public programs are neutralized through compensatory reduc-
tions within families. This is not true for poorer families in this example
or for all families when fertility can vary (see Becker and Barro 1985).
Moreover, we have shown that progressive income taxes reduce the in-
centive to invest in children. We claim not neutrality but that our analysis
of family behavior is helpful in understanding the effects of various pub-
lic programs on the rise and fall of families.
Systematic empirical evidence is necessary before this and other
claims can be evaluated. We close by reiterating our belief that such evi-
dence will confirm that the analysis of family behavior within a utility-
maximizing framework provides many insights into the rise and fall of
families in modern societies.
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